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ARTICLES
This is a speech delivered by The Honorable Stanley Mosk,
Justice of the Supreme Court of California, at the T.C. Williams
School of Law's eighth annual Emroch Lecture. Among his many
achievements, Justice Mosk has authored some of California's
most constructive legislative proposals in the crime and law en-
forcement fields, including the measure creating the Commission
on Peace Officers Standards and Training.
THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN AN ERA OF
BIG GOVERNMENT
The Honorable Stanley Mosk
I am certain there are a number of future judges in this impres-
sive audience. I will not embarrass you by asking you to identify
yourselves. However, lest you are under the impression that every-
where judging is a quiet, reflective and reclusive vocation, let me
cite some figures recently released by the International Commis-
sion of Jurists, based in Geneva.1
In the year 1990-1991, at least 532 judges and lawyers around
the world were murdered, detained, or officially harassed. Of that
number, 55 were killed, 103 were detained, 42 were attacked, 65
were threatened and 8 disappeared.
For example, in Columbia alone, thirty-seven judges and lawyers
were murdered. In the Sudan, all non-fundamentalist judges were
dismissed after the June 1989 coup, the bar association was
banned, and seventeen lawyers were sent to prison without trial or
even any charges. In Yugoslavia, in one province 180 ethnic Alba-
1. INT'L COMMISSION OF JURISTS NEws. Jan. 1992.
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nian judges and prosecutors were removed. In Peru, ten jurists
were killed and twenty-six others were victims of violence or
threats. In China, eleven jurists were jailed for their pro-democracy
sympathies. In Myanmar, Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Tunisia,
all civilian judges were summarily removed and replaced by mili-
tary or special tribunals. And even in France and Italy, activities of
some judges were curtailed when they were deemed to be getting
too close to sensitive political issues.
To those of you who will be lawyers in the future, one of your
most unpleasant experiences will be lawyer bashing. This is a rela-
tively new phenomenon employed by stand-up comedians and,
most recently, by Vice President Dan Quayle. Is there any validity
to the complaints about lawyers, and particularly about the United
States having too many of them?
Of course there are a few bad apples in our barrel, but discipli-
nary agencies take rather good care of them with disbarment or
sanctions. Most of the other current charges do not withstand
analysis.
Take, for example, a recent statement by Dan Quayle that "the
legal system ... now costs Americans an estimated $300 billion a
year." Where did that figure come from? It was cited by the self-
styled Agenda for Civil Justice Reform prepared by the so-called
Council on Competitiveness, chairman Dan Quayle.2 Where did the
Council get that $300 billion figure? From an article in Forbes
magazine.' And what was Forbes' source? A book by Peter Huber,
whose career has been as a prolific author of tort-bashing books
and articles.4
But here is what Huber actually wrote in his 1988 book entitled
Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences; equating
tort liability with:
a tax that directly costs American individuals, businesses, munici-
palities, and other government bodies at least $80 billion a year, a
figure that equals the total profits of the country's top 200 corpora-
tions. But many of the tax's costs are indirect and unmeasurable...
. The extent of these indirect costs can only be guessed at.5
2. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA (Aug. 1991).
3. Ronald Bailey, Legal Mayhem, FORBES, Nov. 14, 1988, at 97.
4. PETER W. HUBER, LIABILrrY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 4 (1988).
5. Id.
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So from an unmeasurable sum, to a guessed-at figure, the Vice
President tells the people of the United States, as a fact, that the
legal system is costing them $300 billion a year.
I suggest that instead of lawyer bashing, we may need some poli-
tician bashing.
The oft-repeated statement that there are too many lawyers is
also disturbing. Dan Quayle and others have declared that we have
some seventy-five percent of the lawyers in the world.' Once again,
exaggeration replaces reality. Without obtaining data from much
of Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and
Latin America, documents on file at the Institute for Legal Studies
at the University of Wisconsin establish that we have approxi-
mately thirty-four percent of the world's lawyers and the figure
will be lower when information is obtained from the other coun-
tries. One-third does not appear to be an unreasonable percentage
for the world's greatest economic and industrial nation.
We have had a number of bicentennials these past several years.
There was the bicentennial of the adoption of the Constitution, the
bicentennial of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and in 1990, the
bicentennial of the United States Supreme Court as it became a
reality when President Washington appointed the first justices.
The original Court was to begin its work on February 1, 1790,
but there were two problems. First, only three of the six justices
showed up, not enough to constitute a quorum. And more impor-
tantly, there was not a single case on the calendar.
Justice William Cushing of Massachusetts appeared in a pow-
dered wig, a British custom that failed to catch on in the new na-
tion. On February 2nd, Justice John Blair of Virginia arrived and a
quorum was realized. The term, however, lasted only two days.
Still no cases.
The Court did not announce its first decision until 1792. There-
fore, we may now note the bicentennial of the working and produc-
tive Supreme Court.
6. David G. Savage, Senate to Enter Fray on Products Liability Issue; Bush Campaign:
Attack on Trial Lawyers Will Get Test in Debate on Bill to Preempt State Laws. Drugs,
Medical Devices are Involved., LA. T'Ss, Sept. 7, 1992, at A28 (reporting that "Quayle
repeatedly has cited ... that 70% of the world's lawyers live in the United States. .. ").
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The first Chief Justice, John Jay, found life in the capital to be
"intolerable" and he soon took off for other more exciting and re-
warding duties, ultimately as Governor of New York.
Of course, much has changed in the past two centuries. These
days, the Court term lasts nine months and involves more than
5000 petitions for hearing. The Court announces about 150 deci-
sions each term. Since 1935, the Court has had its own imposing
building. Since 1981, members of the Court no longer address each
other as "Mr. Justice." That ended when Sandra Day O'Connor
joined the bench. These days we no longer only have heroes; we
also have sheroes.
It was not until John Marshall became our third chief justice
that the Court took on many monumental cases. His Court han-
dled a calendar of nearly a thousand cases. But before you deem
that to be significant, consider the state supreme court on which I
sit. Last year we handled 5537 matters; a monthly average of 461
cases. This is where the action is - at the state level. I will talk
more about this in a moment.
As we approach our annual Law Day, we cannot overlook the
unbelievably significant events that have recently taken place. Cer-
tainly these years will go down in history as among the most mo-
mentous since the American and French revolutions.
There is no question, as the President declared in his State of
the Union address: "this has been a dramatic and deeply promising
time in our history."'7 He was referring, of course, to the remarka-
ble changes in the former Soviet Union and throughout Eastern
Europe. Country after country disavowed regimes that denied indi-
vidual rights, and opted for adoption of democratic values. Most of
them did not achieve the full spectrum of guarantees of individual
rights to which Americans have aspired over the past 200 years;
but there can be no question that the movement has been in that
direction.
Never in our wildest dreams did we imagine the progress toward
human rights that 1991 produced. We could not have conceived of
a place like Lithuania, not only declaring its independence, but or-
dering the release from prison of all who had been convicted on the
basis of KGB-induced confessions. True, some evil people, includ-
7. President George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 28, 1992), 28 WEKLY COMP. PRas. Doc. 170 (Feb. 3, 1992).
[Vol. 27:1
THE ROLE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS
ing former Nazi collaborators, obtained their freedom; but the
principle was established that imprisonment could not be justified
on the basis of forced confessions.
It is truly ironic that just a few months preceding that time, the
United States Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Fulminantes that
a forced confession did not require reversal per se. A five-justice
majority, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter, held
that the harmless error rule applies to coerced confessions. The re-
markable rationale of Chief Justice Rehnquist was that introduc-
tion of a coerced confession is simply "a classic trial error"9 that
does not "transcend ... the criminal process."'1
The harmless error doctrine apparently had its origin in Chap-
man v. California." But that very Court cautioned that "there are
some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infrac-
tion can never be treated as harmless error." 2 Those circum-
stances enumerated were: right to counsel,13 biased judges, 4 and
coerced confessions.' 5 Subsequent to Chapman, the Supreme
Court added three other serious errors not subject to the harmless
error rule. These were: exclusion of members of the defendant's
race from the grand jury," the right to represent oneself at trial, 7
and the right to a public trial.""
Refusal to tolerate coerced confessions had its origin in Anglo-
American jurisprudence nearly 400 years ago. Brain v. United
States'9 described a case decided in 1616, quoting Lord Coke:
"[T]he human mind under the pressure of calamity is easily se-
duced, and is liable, in the alarm of danger, to acknowledge indis-
criminately a falsehood or a truth, as different agitations may pre-
vail. . . . [The] law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the
deluded instrument of his own conviction."'
8. 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
9. Id. at 1264-65.
10. Id. at 1265.
11. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
12. Id. at 23.
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.5. 335 (1963).
14. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
15. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
16. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986).
17. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984).
18. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
19. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
20. Id. at 547 (quoting Burrowes v. High Comm'n Court BuIst 49 (1616)).
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Subsequent case after case, prior to Fulminante, decried the use
of coerced confessions. 21
With a sweep of the pen, the fundamental right recognized by
years of unbroken precedent was swept aside by the bare majority
in Fulminante, apparently out of misguided zeal to convict one
they believed to be guilty.
So, as Lithuania, one of the newest professed democracies in the
world, was freeing prisoners convicted on the basis of coerced con-
fessions, the United States of America, the world's oldest democ-
racy, was finding coerced confessions could be harmless. How
ironic.
This kind of calculated damage to the principle of stare decisis is
disturbing. Retired Justice Lewis Powell recently wrote on the im-
portance of stare decisis 2  The doctrine is, he wrote, "essential to
the rule of law."'23 He quoted Justice Frankfurter, who aptly noted
the critical importance of stare decisis which he described as the
principle "by whose circumspect observance the wisdom of this
court as an institution transcending the moment can alone be
brought to bear on the difficult problems that confront us."'24
Justice Powell reduced the merits of stare decisis to three simple
specifics:
(i) The first is one of special interest to judges: it makes our work
easier. As Justice Cardozo put it: "[T]he labor of judges would be
increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could
21. See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 587 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring); see also Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944) ("A coerced
confession is offensive to basic standards of justice ... declarations procured by torture are
not premises from which a civilized forum will infer guilt."); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315, 320-21 (1959) ("[I]n the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal
methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals them-
selves."); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960) ("As important as it is that
persons who have committed crimes be convicted, there are considerations which transcend
the question of guilt or innocence. Thus, in cases involving involuntary confessions, [the]
Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values are
sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a [confession], wr-
ings a confession out of accused against his will."); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540
(1961) ([Clonvictions following admission into evidence of confessions which are involuntary
... cannot stand.").
22. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13.
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id. at 15 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
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be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of
bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who
had gone before him." . . .It cannot be suggested seriously that
every case brought to the Court should require reexamination on the
merits of every relevant precedent.
(ii) Stare decisis also enhances stability in the law. This is espe-
cially important in cases involving property rights and commercial
transactions. Even in the area of personal rights, stare decisis is nec-
essary to have a predictable set of rules on which citizens may rely
in shaping their behavior.
(iii) Perhaps the most important and familiar argument for stare
decisis is one of public legitimacy. The respect given the Court by
the public and by the other branches of government rests in large
part on the knowledge that the Court is not composed of unelected
judges free to write their policy views into law. Rather, the Court is
a body vested with the duty to exercise the judicial power prescribed
by the Constitution. An important aspect of this is the respect that
the Court shows for its own previous opinions.25
Another egregious violation of stare decisis occurred when the
Supreme Court in June 1991, directly overruled its own decisions
rendered a mere two and four years earlier. I speak of Payne v.
26Tennessee, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and a majority
overruled Booth v. Maryland27 and South Carolina v. Gathers.28
Booth and Gathers merely held that whether a defendant in a cap-
ital case receives death or a lesser penalty should depend on the
circumstances of the offense and a weighing of aggravating and
mitigating factors in the defendant's life. The opinions of surviving
family members are irrelevant. Now under Payne,29 members of
the victim's grieving family may tearfully demand of the judge and
jury that the culprit be put to death to atone for their loss. Justice
Marshall, in dissent, undiplomatically noted that the new decision
was the result of a change in Court personnel.30 He wrote, "Power,
not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decision-making." 31
He expressed the fear that the Court now "sends a clear signal that
25. Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
26. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
27. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
28. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
29. 111 S. Ct. 2597.
30. Id. at 2619 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
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scores of established constitutional liberties are now ripe for
reconsideration."3 2
Before someone grumbles that, as Dickens wrote in Oliver Twist,
"the law is a ass''ss and often needs to be rejected, I will concede
that there are occasions when human progress requires reversing
prior court opinions. Certainly Brown v. Board of Education,"
which specifically overruled Plessy v. Ferguson,35 cannot be criti-
cized today. I also have no trouble justifying Baker v. Carr,"6 the
reapportionment case, which overruled Colegrove v. Green,37 or
Taylor v. Louisiana, s which removed the restrictions on women
serving as jurors that had been imposed in Hoyt v. Florida.3 9
Nevertheless, with the foregoing type of rational exceptions, I
must agree in general with Justice Powell that "[iun the long run,
restraint in decision-making and respect for decisions once made
are the keys to preservation of an independent judiciary and the
guardian of rights. '40
Let me now briefly review some legal history, so we can better
comprehend how we got ourselves into what I believe to be retro-
gression at the national level, how we find ourselves going back-
ward just as the rest of the western civilized world moves forward,
and what is being done about it.
For 173 of the first 200 years of this republic, a relentless tide of
judicial authority flowed from the states to the federal government.
From John Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison41 in 1803 to
comparatively recent days, the highest courts in the several states
were often reduced to the status of intermediate appellate tribu-
nals, mere bus stops on the route from trial courts to the Supreme
Court.
I do not say this necessarily in criticism. Indeed, before 1953,
state courts were guilty of a dismal performance in enforcing provi-
32. Id.
33. CHARLES DICKENS, THE ADVENTURES OF OLIVER TWIST 399 (Oxford University Press
1966) (1837).
34. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
35. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
36. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
37. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
38. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
39. 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
40. Powell, supra note 22, at 18.
41. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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sions of their own constitutions. At the same time the federal judi-
ciary tolerated an era that was characterized by a benign accept-
ance of racism, political malapportionment, disability of the poor,
an intolerant approach to sexual matters, denial of universal suf-
frage, egregious imposition on the rights of the criminally accused.
Under Chief Justice Warren and his merry men, perhaps en-
couraged by the civil rights movement of the 1950s, the Supreme
Court abandoned an apathetic approach to overt injustice in soci-
ety and elected to employ the Federal Constitution to achieve a
liberating and egalitarian impact in the areas of political opportu-
nity, criminal justice, and racial equality.
The states were compelled to fall in line; some of them were
dragged kicking and screaming. Despite protests over some of the
decisions, notably in the areas of reapportionment and protection
of the rights of criminal defendants, state courts swallowed their
provincial prejudices and obediently embarked on the designated
new course. The nation and the states truly experienced legal
evolution.
The states ultimately adapted their rulings, in particular their
criminal law techniques, to the High Court's requirements and in
general a satisfactory accommodation was achieved, sort of a judi-
cial detente. Police officers were taught how to lawfully enforce the
law; trial judges became reconciled to admitting only legally ob-
tained evidence. Only the press and some headline-hunting politi-
cians spoke about reversals on technicalities, as if constitutional
guarantees are a mere technicality.
Just as an era of peaceful coexistence seemed imminent, the
post-Warren period began. There have been vast changes in the
High Court.
What then can reasonably be expected of state courts? Are they
to create doctrines of state authority one year and then abandon
them the next year as the tides on the Potomac ebb and flow? I
think not. Such inconsistency is confusing to the bench and bar,
counterproductive to law enforcement and demeaning to the judi-
cial process.
A few illustrations come to mind. Consider the simple require-
ment that counsel be present at lineups. This rule was adopted by
the Supreme Court in 1967 in United States v. Wade4 2 and Gilbert
42. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
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v. California3 under the frequently articulated theory that adver-
sary criminal proceedings begin not in the courtroom but at the
police station.44
The court in Wade emphasized the importance of the presence
of counsel at "critical confrontations 4 5 and firmly declared that
"we scrutinize. . . pretrial confrontation of the accused."4 And in
Stovall v. Denno,47 the Court added unequivocally that "counsel is
required at all confrontations" for identification.4"
That sounded clear and emphatic. State courts obediently fol-
lowed directions from above. Manifestly, it seemed to most states,
"any" pretrial confrontation and "all" confrontations for identifi-
cation implied no limitation.
But along came Kirby v. Illinois49 in 1972 and suddenly the
High Court found it to be "firmly established" that the right to
counsel attaches only at the time judicial proceedings have been
initiated.50 "Any" and "all" lost something in the translation. They
now mean "very few," for post-indictment lineups are rarely held,
and when they are, it is to refresh identifications previously made.
Alaska 51 and Pennsylvania 52 specifically refused to follow Kirby.
Take the murky field of obscenity. What test does the Supreme
Court require?
For years federal and state courts grappled with the Roth53 rule.
To some judges the problem was simple. An Ohio judge adopted
this pragmatic test: "That the material acts as an aphrodisiac can
almost be determined physically . . . a judge or juror should be
able to estimate that rather closely by the reaction he himself has
to the material. '54 I can hear his jury instruction now: "Ladies and
43. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
44. See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
45. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224.
46. Id. at 227.
47. 388 U.S.-293 (1967).
48. Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
49. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
50. Id. at 688.
51. See Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977).
52. See Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974).
53. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (finding that a lack of precision in federal
obscenity statute does not offend constitutional safeguards or fail to give adequate notice of
what is prohibited).
54. City of Cincinnati v. Walton, 145 N.E.2d 407, 413 (Ohio 1957).
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gentlemen of the jury: in the final analysis what is obscene is
whatever turns you on."
Just as the states, one way or another, were adjusting to Roth, in
1973 the rules of the game were abruptly changed in Miller v. Cali-
fornia.2 Whereas previously the High Court declared in Roth and
reaffirmed in Jacobellis v. Ohio56 that "the constitutional status of
an allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a
national Constitution we are expounding," 5 in the Miller test,
courts are to apply "contemporary community standards." 8
There are many more illustrations of federal vacillation, but
time limitations and your patience forbid recitation.
When the Supreme Court truck careens from one side of the
constitutional road to the other, state courts have one of two alter-
natives. They can shift gears and once again change directions,
thus resuming the course upon which they were originally em-
barked pre-Warren, or they can retain existing individual rights by
reliance on the independent nonfederal grounds found in the sev-
eral state constitutions. A growing number of states have adopted
the latter course. They have accepted Justice Brennan's cordial in-
vitation in Michigan v. Mosley;59 he reminded us that each "state
has power to impose higher standards governing police practices
under state law than is required by the Federal Constitution.""0
You may wonder how these "higher standards" apply in actual
practice. Do the states have a genuine rationale when they afford
their states' citizens more than the bare minimum of rights af-
forded under our national charter? Let me offer some examples of
how state constitutions have been employed to differ with federal
constitutional interpretations.
If a person is stopped by a police officer for a simple traffic in-
fraction, the motorist may be subjected to a full body search, all
parts of his vehicle searched, and all containers opened and ex-
amined. No constitutional violation, said the United States Su-
55. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
56. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
57. Id. at 195 ("[TIhe constitutional status of an allegedly obscene work must be deter-
mined on the basis of a national standard. It is, after all, a national Constitution we are
expounding.").
58. Miller, 413 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
59. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
60. Id. at 120 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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preme Court in Robinson61 and Gustafson.6 2 But many states
found such police conduct offended state constitutional provisions
unless the officer has articulable reasons to suspect other illegal
conduct.
A police officer or a public prosecutor may walk into a bank and,
with no authority of process, demand to examine the bank records
of a named individual or corporation. No constitutional violation,
said the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller.6 3
But in a California case involving a lawyer, we observed that one's
cancelled checks, loan applications, etc., are a mini-biography; that
one expects his bank records to be used only for internal bank
processes and therefore an examination of them violates the state
constitutional right of privacy, unless the records are obtained by a
warrant or subpoena.6 4
In Swain v. Alabama" the U.S. Supreme Court declared there
can be no restrictions whatever on the use of peremptory chal-
lenges of jurors. California agreed in principle, but declared an ex-
ception under state constitution principles: the challenges may not
be used for a racially discriminatory purpose.6 6 Ultimately the Su-
preme Court unanimously reversed Swain and finally agreed with
the position our court had taken eight years earlier.6
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie6 that
the mental health records of an accuser in a rape case could be
submitted only to the trial court for an in camera review. The
Massachusetts high court held, to the contrary, that the accuser's
entire mental health records were to be given to the defense coun-
sel without any prior review by the trial judge.6" It might have
been interesting if William Kennedy Smith and Mike Tyson had
been tried in Massachusetts.
There is a growing tendency to allow a child victim to testify by
means of videotape, outside the presence of the defendant. The
61. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
62. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
63. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
64. Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974).
65. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
66. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
67. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
68. 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (Children and Youth Services child abuse investigative file could
only be submitted to the trial court for an in camera review).
69. Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992 (Mass. 1991).
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U.S. Supreme Court would undoubtedly permit testimony in this
manner, under Maryland v. Craig.7 0 The Indiana Supreme Court
held that under its state constitution a defendant has the right to
meet his accuser face to face.7 1 A videotape presentation would not
meet the state constitutional requirement. 2
Although sobriety roadblocks would undoubtedly be approved
by the United States Supreme Court, since it found no problem
with inspection of everyone on a bus, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island found such roadblocks, without particularized suspicion, to
be violative of its state constitutional right of privacy.73
Federal courts, and indeed most state courts, would hold that a
witness' privilege against self incrimination is waived once he testi-
fies to part of the subject matter as to which the privilege is as-
serted. However, Maryland holds that even if there has been a
waiver of a federal right and partial testimony, a witness may still
assert privilege under article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. The court indicated that only that state and New Jersey
follow what it described as the English rule.
74
In Penry v. Lynaugh 5 the Supreme Court held that the execu-
tion of mentally retarded persons does not violate the Eighth
Amendment. The Georgia Supreme Court held that "although the
rest of the nation might not agree, under the Georgia Constitution
the execution of the mentally retarded constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment. 1 6
Garbage bags left on the curb for collection; no right of privacy
held the United States Supreme Court in California v. Green-
wood. 77 The New Jersey Supreme Court held there is an expecta-
tion of privacy and that a search warrant is necessary before the
garbage bag may be inspected.7 8
How about a dog sniff to ferret out narcotics? Not a search, held
the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Place.7 9 The New
70. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
71. Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981 (Ind. 1991).
72. Id.
73. Pimental v. Rhode Island Dept. of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989).
74. Choi v. State, 560 A.2d 1108 (Md. 1989).
75. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
76. Fleming v. Zant, 386 S.E.2d 339, 342 (Ga. 1989).
77. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
78. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990).
79. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
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Hampshire Supreme Court held that it is indeed a search under
the state constitution subject to the rules of reasonable suspicion.80
Query: must the dog get a search warrant?
In Patton v. Yount,81 the Supreme Court held there is a pre-
sumption of correctness to be afforded a trial court's ruling on a
motion for change of venue. In a capital case, the Georgia Supreme
Court declared a "better and surer" rule was needed, and held that
a change of venue had to be granted if the defendant makes a sub-
stantial showing of the likelihood of prejudice by reason of exten-
sive pretrial publicity.8 2
In North Carolina, a former dean of a state university sued on a
theory that he had been removed in retaliation for his exercise of
his right to free speech. The defendants insisted there was sover-
eign immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and prevailed below. The
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the ground that free-
dom of speech under the state constitution was paramount. The
court noted with some pride that the state constitutional conven-
tion of 1776 adopted a state Declaration of Rights prior to such
rights being written into the Federal Constitution, thus manifest-
ing its primacy8 3
In Minnesota, the police, in the course of apprehending a sus-
pect, damaged property of a third person."4 In the resulting law-
suit, the defense was that there was no* taking under the Federal
Constitution. 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court held that there was,
in effect, a taking under the state constitution,"8 that otherwise it
would be unfair to allocate the entire risk of loss to an innocent
homeowner for the good of the general public.8 7
In Traylor v. State"' the Florida Supreme Court emphatically
declared the primacy of its state constitution in a criminal law
case. The issue involved the admissibility of confessions to out-of-
state crimes.8" The court began by noting that, to be admissible,
80. State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990).
81. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
82. Jones v. State, 409 S.E.2d 642, 643 (Ga. 1991).
83. Corum v. University of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992).
84. Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991).
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id. at 41-42.
87. Id. at 42.
88. 596 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1992).
89. Id. at 961.
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the confessions had to pass under both the state and federal con-
stitutions; only if they were admissible under the Florida Constitu-
tion, was it necessary to address federal law.90 The Florida court
observed that, as of 1986, eleven states had interpreted the self-
incrimination provisions of their own state constitutions indepen-
dently of federal Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.91 Those states
include: Alaska, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Vermont and Wy-
oming.92 The court observed that state constitutions had tradition-
ally served as the prime protectors of their citizens' basic freedoms,
and further wrote that, if the Federal Constitution represented the
"floor" for basic freedoms, the constitutions of the states repre-
sented the "ceiling.19 3 Thus, in looking to the provisions of Flor-
ida's Declaration of Rights, the court was bound to construe its
text in order to maximize the protections afforded an individual
against government intrusion or overreaching.
9 4
In California v. Acevedo95 and United States v. Ross,96 the Su-
preme Court held in effect that there is a diminished expectation
of privacy in a container placed inside an automobile. The Ver-
mont Supreme Court declined to buy that concept. It held that the
efficient performance of law enforcement officers does not trump
individual rights.97 Thus, Vermont decided the case on the basis of
the defendant's expectation of privacy, which, it said, was pro-
tected more broadly under the state constitution than in the
Fourth Amendment.98
In recent years Vermont has become a staunch defender of state
constitutionalism. In State v. Blow,99 the court held that the Ver-
mont Constitution prohibited warrantless monitoring of defend-
ant's conversations with a police informant in a defendant's home
on the ground that one had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his own home. I should mention that in a companion case, the
90. Id.
91. Id. at 961 n.2.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 961-62.
94. Id. at 963.
95. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
96. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
97. State v. Sawa, 616 A.2d 774 (Vt. 1991).
98. Id.
99. 602 A.2d 552 (Vt. 1991).
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court held this same expectation of privacy did not apply to con-
versations in a shopping center parking lot.100
Utah came up with an unusual case. Its supreme court found
that enumerating categories of dangerous dogs did not violate the
state constitution's equal protection clause. A city adopted a regu-
lation affecting certain breeds of canines, such as bull terriers, staf-
fordshire terriers, etc., and owners of those animals complained of
the canine discrimination. 10 1 The supreme court found no violation
of the state's equal protection clause, holding the evidence of the
dangerousness of the named breeds to be sufficient to justify re-
strictions for public safety.10 2
In United States v. Leon,03 the Supreme Court created a "good
faith exception" to the warrant requirement even when the war-
rant was ultimately found to be invalid. Oregon refused to apply
Leon in excluding evidence obtained by a warrant that the authori-
ties would not have obtained had they obeyed the constitution. 104
New York 0 5 and New Jersey 06 have flatly refused to follow Leon.
Illinois v. Gates10 7 established a two-prong test for determining
the validity of a warrant. It is interesting how the states have di-
vided on accepting the High Court version. Nineteen states have
adopted Gates, eleven have rejected it, eight as a matter of state
constitutional law. 08
As a final example, consider a commonly recurring factual situa-
tion. A small orderly group of citizens undertakes to pass out leaf-
lets, or to solicit signatures on petitions, in a privately owned shop-
ping center. The shopping center owners seek to prohibit that
activity. "Shut up and shop" is their philosophy.
Obviously there is a built-in tension between two constitutional
guarantees. On the one hand, the citizens assert their right of free-
dom of speech and the right to petition their government for a re-
dress of grievances. On the other hand, the shopping center owners
100. State v. Brooks, 601 A.2d 963 (Vt. 1991).
101. Greenwood v. City of N. Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1991).
102. Id. at 821.
103. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
104. State v. Kosta, 748 P.2d 72 (Or. 1989).
105. People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985).
106. State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 1987).
107. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (establishing the totality of the circumstances
test).
108. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 58 (1991).
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assert their right to possess and control private property and to
exclude all non-business related activity. In that conflict which
right is to prevail?
The Supreme Court of California held in 1970 that unless there
is obstruction or undue interference with normal business opera-
tions, title of the property owners does not outweigh the substan-
tial interest of individuals and groups to engage in peaceful and
orderly free speech activities on the premises of shopping centers
open to the public.10 9
On four occasions the shopping center owners sought certiorari
and rehearing from denial of certiorari, and in each instance they
were rebuffed by the High Court, with no votes noted to grant. We
had every reason to believe Diamond v. Bland was the law.
Two years later, however, the Supreme Court took over an iden-
tical case from Oregon, and in Lloyd v. Tanner"° held that the
owners had the right to prohibit distribution of political handbills
unrelated to the operation of the shopping center.
Then, in 1979 our court decided in Robins v. Pruneyard that the
free speech provisions of the California Constitution offer "greater
protection than the First Amendment now seems to provide.""'
We flatly refused to follow Lloyd v. Tanner.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Robins
v. Pruneyard, and I must confess we sensed doom to our theory of
state constitutionalism. But, to our delight, the Supreme Court
agreed with us, 9_0.112 Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion that
declared the reasoning in Lloyd v. Tanner "does not ex proprio
vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police power
or its sovereign right to adopt in its Constitution individual liber-
ties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution."" 3
An Oregon court was faced with a criminal prosecution initiated
by a shopping center owner against a group seeking signatures on
initiative petitions. The court observed that:
109. Diamond v. Bland, 477 P.2d 733 (Cal. 1970).
110. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
111. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 347 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
112. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
113. Id. at 81 (citations omitted).
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[w]hen the people adopted the initiative and referendum, there were
ample opportunities to collect signatures. Parks, town squares and
courthouses were common gathering places, and store entrances
were usually directly off public sidewalks. The people could meet
and conduct their legislative business on public property.
Today, the situation has substantially changed. Parks and court-
houses are not the only, or even primary, foci of modern life. Many
people who seldom go to those places now congregate at shopping
centers. Privately owned stores and shopping centers typically are
connected to privately owned parking areas, and stores are con-
structed so that entrances open on private property rather than on
public sidewalks. Every part of a store or shopping center where it is
feasible to seek signatures for initiative or referendum petitions is
often privately owned.114
The court noted that the shopping center's
invitation to the public was broad and for more than just commer-
cial activity. Its premises, by reason of the owner's invitation, be-
came a forum for assembly by the community. Notwithstanding the
company's apparent policy against allowing petitioners on its prop-
erty, there is no evidence that defendants' activities substantially in-
terfered with [the owner's] commercial activity, had a serious eco-
nomic impact on the company or interfered with its 'reasonable
investment backed expectations." 5
While Colorado agreed in principle," 6 I must concede that Iowa,
Wisconsin, Massachusetts and Michigan have reached contrary re-
sults under their state laws. 1
7
If you need a prime example of how state justices are more un-
derstanding of the realities of life, consider the recent case out of
Texas involving Leonel Herrera, convicted of murder." 8 After los-
ing his appeals below,"19 he sought review in the United States Su-
114. State v. Cargill, 786 P.2d 208, 211 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
115. Id. at 214.
116. See Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991).
117. See, e.g., State v. Lacy, 465 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1991).
118. See Herrera v. State, 682 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
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preme Court. It takes four votes to grant a hearing, and he re-
ceived four affirmative votes.12 0
However, his date of execution was approaching. It takes five
votes to grant a stay. None of the five justices who did not vote for
the hearing would budge an inch to stay his execution.21 Thus the
pragmatic fact appeared to be that Herrera would get a hearing,
but would be executed before he could learn the result. A strange
concept of justice by the highest court in the land.
Fortunately there were two justices of the state court in Texas
who were understanding. Minutes before Herrera's execution they
granted the stay which had been denied by Justices Rehnquist,
White, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Once again, a state judiciary
shows the way to justice.
How pervasive have state constitutional law cases been in the
various states? The National Association of Attorneys General
publishes a monthly bulletin on cases decided strictly on the basis
of state constitutions, and found the distribution over the past four
years to be the following: California produced forty-nine such
cases, New York and Florida twenty-six each, Massachusetts
twenty-five, Washington twenty-two, Pennsylvania twenty-one, Or-
egon eighteen, North Carolina seventeen, Utah fifteen, and others
lesser amounts. Virginia was cited six times. Only South Dakota
rated a total blank.122
On the general subject of federalism, in passing I must note a
certain dichotomy between promises and performance. Every can-
didate for President, and every candidate for Congress, promise to
reduce the federal government and to return controls to the states.
No sooner do they get elected, and get off the airplane at Dulles
Airport than they devise measures to increase federal authority
over activities within the states. The usual means is federal pre-
emption. Over the past decade alone, more than twenty-five new
major preemptive statutes were passed by the Congress and ap-
proved by Presidents Reagan and Bush. 2 ' I cite this merely to in-
dicate that while Washington tries to legislatively dominate the
120. See Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992).
121. Id.
122. NATIONAL AssOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, STATE CONST. L. BULL., Vol. V, No. 1
(Oct. 1991).
123. See Timothy J. Conlan, And the Best Goes On: Intergovernmental Mandates and
Preemption in an Era of Deregulation, 21 PUBLIUS 43, 52 (1991).
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states, and it generally succeeds in the regulatory area, it cannot
control the states when they employ their state constitutions in as-
suring their citizens broader individual rights.
No doubt there is a growing interest in true federalism. There
was a time when states' rights were associated with Orval Faubus
and George Wallace barring the entrance of blacks to public
schools. We are long past that confrontational period.
Last year the high court of Texas forthrightly declared that
when interpreting its state constitution, it "will not be bound by
Supreme Court decisions . . . [w]e recognize that state constitu-
tions cannot subtract from the rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, but they can provide additional rights to their
citizens. 'The federal constitution sets the floor for individual
rights; state constitutions establish the ceiling.' "124 The court
added that "state courts can better respond to local interests ...
Our society is at once homogeneous, and heterogeneous and our
legal culture should correspondingly be homogeneous (national)
and heterogeneous (state). Moreover, the very concept of federal-
ism embraces such an approach.' 125
Thus, today states' rights are associated with increased, not less-
ened, individual guarantees. There is every indication, particularly
since Pruneyard, that the Rehnquist court will defer to the states
when they rely on state constitutional provisions.
At the top of any agenda on this subject must be James
Madison's words in The Federalist (No. XLIV):
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
state governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be
exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation,
and foreign commerce, with which last the power of taxation will,
for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several
states will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.'26
Sound policy 200 years ago. Sound policy today.
124. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting LeCroy v.
Harlon, 713 S.W.2d 335, 338 (Tex. 1986)).
125. Id. at 687.
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 174 (James Madison) (William B. Munro ed., 1914).
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